Spread of infectious disease and social awareness as parasitic
  contagions on clustered networks by Hébert-Dufresne, Laurent et al.
Spread of infectious disease and social awareness as parasitic
contagions on clustered networks
Laurent He´bert-Dufresne1,2,*, Dina Mistry3, Benjamin M. Althouse3,4,5
1 Department of Computer Science, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT 05405, USA
2 Vermont Complex Systems Center, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT 05405, USA
3 Institute for Disease Modeling, Bellevue, WA, 98005, USA
4 University of Washington, Seattle, WA, 98105, USA
5 New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM, 88003, USA
* laurent.hebert-dufresne@uvm.edu
Abstract
There is a rich history of models for the interaction of a biological contagion like influenza with
the spread of related information such as an influenza vaccination campaign. Recent work on the
spread of interacting contagions on networks has highlighted that these interacting contagions
can have counter-intuitive interplay with network structure. Here we generalize one of these
frameworks to tackle three important features of the spread of awareness and disease: one, we
model the dynamics on highly clustered, cliquish, networks to mimic the role of workplaces and
households; two, the awareness contagion affects the spread of the biological contagion by
reducing its transmission rate where an aware or vaccinated individual is less likely to be
infected; and three, the biological contagion also affects the spread of the awareness contagion
but by increasing its transmission rate where an infected individual is more receptive and more
likely to share information related to the disease. Under these conditions, we find that increasing
network clustering, which is known to hinder disease spread, can actually allow them to sustain
larger epidemics of the disease in models with awareness. This counter-intuitive result goes
against the conventional wisdom suggesting that random networks are justifiable as they provide
worst-case scenario forecasts. To further investigate this result, we provide a closed-form
criterion based on a two-step branching process (i.e., the numbers of expected tertiary infections)
to identify different regions in parameter space where the net effect of clustering and
co-infection varies. Altogether, our results highlight once again the need to go beyond random
networks in disease modeling and illustrate the type of analysis that is possible even in complex
models of interacting contagions.
Author summary
Epidemics of infectious diseases obviously interact with human behaviour, and mathematical
models provide a principled way of studying these interactions. Unfortunately, the same
scenario becomes less tractable when behaviour is affected by a social contagion, such as the
#FlattenTheCurve message currently spreading on social media in the hope of slowing the
spread of COVID-19. Interactions across contagions are multi-dimensional: The messaging
raises awareness and slows the spread of the disease around aware individuals by promoting
hand washing and social distancing, and individuals who are experiencing the illness are also
more likely to spread preventive messages. We model these interactions as a system of parasitic
contagions where the awareness both benefit from and hinders the spread of the disease. We
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show how the dynamics of parasitic contagions differ from classic disease models, and most
importantly, how social clustering or isolation can lead to worse outbreaks than the random
mixing assumes by classic models. Our results illustrate the need to track messaging around
public health crises and to include social awareness in our models and forecasts.
1 Introduction
Models of contagion are used to study the transmission dynamics of a pathogen or information
being transmitted through a structured population. Most of these are defined as compartmental
models [1], which mathematically distinguishes individuals based on their state; i.e., whether
they are susceptible to a contagion or infectious with that contagion. Using this approach,
coupling different contagions to model their interactions is straightforward as we can then
simply distinguish individuals based on all possible combinations of states for the different
contagions. Of particular interest is the coupling of an infectious disease with the spread of
preventative information related to the disease [2]. We typically expect this “disease awareness”
to at least hinder, if not completely stop, the spread of the pathogen. Since both the pathogen and
the information spread through standard contagion mechanisms, their coupled dynamics is often
referred to as either antagonistic or dueling contagions. Here, we assume that the coupling
between awareness and disease is twofold: Awareness reduces the transmission rate of a disease,
but sees its own transmission rate increased by the presence of the disease. Studies in health
psychology suggest that individuals are more likely to adopt preventative behaviors related to a
disease – hand wawashing, self isolation, vaccination, treatment-seeking – if people around them
adopt that behavior and/or if they perceive themselves to be at high risk of infection [3, 4].
Indeed, data collected during and after the 2003 SARS coronavirus outbreak and the 2009 A
(H1N1) influenza pandemic indicate the adoption of preventative behaviors such as increased
hand washing, the use of face masks, and avoiding crowded public spaces in response to these
outbreaks and the increased perception of infection risk [5–7]. We therefore refer to this coupled
awareness-disease system as one of parasitic contagions, since one contagion (awareness) both
hurts and benefits from the other (the disease).
Research on dueling or parasitic contagions tend to assume well-mixed populations [2, 8], in
line with classic epidemic models. However, there are a number of generalized frameworks that
account for the fact that information and disease both spread over a network structure [9–11],
and these frameworks have become more common in recent years with the rise in popularity of
multiplex or multilayer network models [12–16]. In the current work, we relax the well-mixed
assumption to consider the community structure of most networks where connections are often
grouped in dense environments such as households and workplaces. To do so, we rely on two
recent mathematical approaches: (i) a compartmental model coupled to a clique-based master
equation formalism [17, 18] that explicitly tracks the state of different groups; and (ii) a more
straightforward two-step branching process analysis [18] that approximates network clustering.
In Section 2 we present our general model of interacting contagion and provide the
mean-field formalism to follow its evolution. We find that the impact of network clustering on
the interaction of disease and awareness can be non-trivial to predict, and can even accelerate the
spread of the disease. In Section 2.5, we then develop a purely analytical tool based on a
two-step branching process to better inform us of the net effect of clustering on the dynamics.
The two approaches are leveraged together in a case study presented in Section 3 where we show
that there can be finite regions in parameter space where the disease can actually benefit from
network clustering. Section 4 provides conclusions and outlines potential areas of future work.
Altogether, our results raise potential questions about optimal coupling between the
epidemiological parameters of a disease, the behavioral parameters of awareness, and the
network structure of the population.
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Fig 1. Schematization of the particular topology and dynamics studied in this paper. An open
circle represents a susceptible individual; a shaded one, a contagious individual (infected with
the disease, awareness, or both); and a black circle represents a group (or clique). The topology
is constructed by allowing individuals to belong to a given number of cliques where they can be
linked to other participants (solid lines). Note that in the formalism, the cliques are distinguished
by their exact population and state, while the precise connections between them remain
unspecified. Modified from Ref. [17].
2 Awareness and disease as parasitic infections
2.1 Network structures
To study parasitic contagions on clustered contact networks, we use a general definition of
community structure where every network is decomposed in terms of groups [19]. The contact
network between individuals can thus be interpreted as the projection of a bipartite networks
where nodes are connected to social groups of different sizes. In this context, even random links
are interpreted as groups of size two. The network topology of our model is illustrated in Fig. 1.
In order to highlight the effects of community structure (CS) versus random network, the CS
network will be compared with its equivalent random network (ERN): a network with exactly
the same degree distribution, but with randomly connected nodes. Both topologies will be
studied analytically and numerically.
Typical network datasets are often only available as a collection of pairwise edges rather than
higher-order structure like groups. One then has to rely on some numerical methods such as
community detection to infer group structure [20]. Likewise, for theoretical models, one can
simply rely on known distributions of groups per node (membership) and of nodes per group
(group size) from previous studies on overlapping communities [21, 22]. We here use the
simplest possible distributions in order to avoid confounding the impact of group structure from
that of degree heterogeneity or degree correlations [23].
The dynamics of a single contagion on this community structure model was studied in [17].
Using a mean-field description, it was shown that the clustering of links in groups slowed down
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propagation as links are wasted on redundant connections instead of reaching new individuals.
Expanding on this study, we more recently introduced a similar mean-field description for two
synergistic disease [18], which is the model that we here generalize to interactions of other
nature.
2.2 Dynamical process
To model the concurrent spread of an infectious disease and awareness of it on clustered
networks, we will introduce a generalization of the model of interacting contagions used in
Ref. [18]. We study the coevolution of two Susceptible-Infectious-Susceptible processes (SIS)
such that, at any given time, the state of each individual is determined by their status regarding
the two contagion processes. Without interaction with the other contagion, an individual with
contagion i would infect its susceptible neighbors at a rate βi and recover at a rate αi, but we
will here introduce a parametrization scheme to modify these rates and model possible
interactions as generally as possible. Note that our model is general and could be applied to any
type of pairwise interaction between two SIS processes. However, as the notation will become
quite involved we will ground our derivation by referring to the first contagion as the disease
(with natural parameters βD and αD) and to the second contagion as awareness (with natural
parameters βA and αA)
To keep track of both contagions simultaneously, we distinguish nodes by their state [XY ]m
where m is their membership number, X ∈ {S1, I1} corresponds to their state regarding the
first contagion and Y ∈ {S2, I2} their state regarding the second. Similarly, we will distinguish
groups by their size n and the states of the nodes they contain. I.e., [ijk]n, where i is the number
of [I1S2] nodes, j is the number of [S1I2] and k is the number of [I1I2]; such that n− i− j − k
yields the number of [S1S2]. Keeping track of the number of nodes with both contagions is
critical considering that we are interested in the effect of co-infection.
In the original model of Ref. [18], co-infection had symmetric effect on both contagions,
embodied in a single interaction parameter. For parasitic contagions, we want one contagion –
the awareness – to benefit from being in the neighborhood of the other, the disease. Individuals
might be more likely to listen to an awareness campaign if they are themselves sick or if the
message comes from a sick individual. Likewise, they might be less likely to forget important
information related to a disease if they are currently infected. We thus expect an increase in
awareness transmission rate around infected individuals, and a decrease in loss of awareness for
infected individuals. Second, we also want the disease to be hindered whenever nodes in a given
neighborhood are aware of transmission risks or related treatment options. We might thus expect
a decrease in disease transmission rate around aware individuals and/or an increase in disease
recovery rate for aware individuals who might avoid contacts and seek treatment.
To track all these possible interactions, we therefore need to distinguish each possible
infection by the state [XY ] of the infector and the state [UV ] of the infectee. The interaction of
these states are embodied in a set of parameters, ρXYUV , γ
XY
UV , τD and τA. The first two give the
factors affecting the transmission rates of the first and second contagion, respectively, when
dealing with a [XY ] to [UV ] contact. For example, a [I1I2] individual will transmit the disease
to a [S1I2] individual at a rate ρIISIβD. Of course, ρ
XY
UV = 0 whenever U ≡ I and γXYUV = 0
whenever V ≡ I as these individuals are already infected with the corresponding contagion;
similarly ρXYUV = 0 whenever X ≡ S and γXYUV = 0 whenever Y ≡ S as only infected
individuals can transmit the contagion. We also consider that ρISSS = γ
SI
SS = 1 to preserve the
natural transmission rate of each contagion, although we still use this term in the general
equations. Finally, τD and τA give the factor by which the recovery rate of the disease or
awareness are modified if the individual is also aware or sick, respectively.
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Table 1. Description of all parameters in the model
Symbol Definition
{gm} Distribution of groups per node (memberships)
{pn} Distribution of nodes per group (sizes)
βD Transmission rate of the disease (S1→ I1)
βA Transmission rate of awareness (S2→ I2)
αD Recovery rate of the disease (I1→ S1)
αA Recovery rate of awareness (I2→ S2)
ρIISS Factor of βD when the infector is aware
ρISSI Factor of βD when the infectee is aware
ρIISI Factor of βD when infector and infectee are aware
γIISS Factor of βA when the infector is sick
γSIIS Factor of βA when the infectee is sick
γIIIS Factor of βA when infector and infectee are aware
τD Factor of αD when the infected is also aware
τA Factor of αA when the infected is also sick
2.3 Mean-field description
A mean-field description of the time evolution of our general model can be written in the spirit
of previous formalisms. Leaving out all explicit mention of time dependencies as all variables
and mean-fields vary in time, the population density within each node state evolves as
d
dt
[S1S2]m = αD [I1S2]m + αA [S1I2]m
−m
(
βDB
(D)
SS + βDB
(A)
SS
)
[S1S2]m (1)
d
dt
[I1S2]m = τAαA [I1I2]m − αD [I1S2]m
+m
(
βAB
(D)
SS [S1S2]m − βDB(A)IS [I1S2]m
)
(2)
d
dt
[S1I2]m = τDαD [I1I2]m − αA [S1I2]m
+m
(
βAB
(A)
SS [S1S2]m − βDB(D)SI [S1I2]m
)
(3)
d
dt
[I1I2]m = −(τDαD + τAαA) [I1I2]m
+m
(
βDB
(D)
SI [S1I2]m + βAB
(A)
IS [I1S2]m
)
(4)
where B(i)UV is a mean-field value of interactions representing the expected number of
interactions with contagion i, per membership, for a node in state [UV ]. Notice that in the
equations, the first row of terms are the recovery events, and the second the infection events. The
challenge in correctly writing the equations is thus solely to correctly identify to which state
each event transfers some population density. Conservation of total population density (i.e. the
sum over all state densities remains equal to one) is easily verified since the sum of Eqs. (1) to
(4) is zero.
Let us assume that we know the density [ijk]n of cliques that contain n individuals with i
nodes contagious with the first contagion only, j contagious with the second contagion only, and
k with both contagions. We could use this information to write the interaction mean-fields for
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the average level of interaction with contagious individuals within a given group:
B
(D)
SS =
∑
[ijk]n
(n−i−j−k) (iρISSS + kρIISS) [ijk]n∑
[ijk]n
(n−i−j−k) [ijk]n
(5)
B
(D)
SI =
∑
[ijk]n
j
(
iρISSI + kρ
II
SI
)
[ijk]n∑
[ijk]n
j [ijk]n
(6)
B
(A)
SS =
∑
[ijk]n
(n−i−j−k) (jγSISS + kγIISS) [ijk]n∑
[ijk]n
(n−i−j−k) [ijk]n
(7)
B
(A)
IS =
∑
[ijk]n
i
(
jγSIIS + kγ
II
IS
)
[ijk]n∑
[ijk]n
i [ijk]n
. (8)
These expressions can be understood with the following logic. For instance, in the case of B(D)SS ,
the susceptible individual is twice as likely to be part of a clique with twice as many susceptible
nodes, which is what the (n− i− j − k) factor takes into account. We then simply average the
infection terms of each possible clique, i.e. iρISSS + kρ
II
SS , over this biased distribution of cliques.
With a variant of these mean-fields, we can now follow the evolution of group states by a
general, but complicated, equation:
d
dt
[ijk]n = (i+ 1)αD [(i+ 1) jk]n + (j + 1)αA [i (j + 1) k]n+
(k + 1)×
{
τDαD [i (j − 1) (k + 1)]n + τAαA [(i− 1) j (k + 1)]n
}
− (iαD + jαA + kτDαD + kτAαA) [ijk]n + βD (n−i+1−j−k)×{
(i−1) ρISSS + kρIISS + B˜(D)SS
}
[(i−1) jk]n
− βD (n−i−j−k)
{
iρISSS + kρ
II
SS + B˜
(D)
SS
}
[ijk]n
+ βA (n−i−j+1−k)
{
(j−1) γSISS + kγIISS + B˜(A)SS
}
[i (j−1) k]n
− βA (n−i−j−k)
{
jγSISS + kγ
II
SS + B˜
(A)
SS
}
[ijk]n
+ βA (i+1)
{
jγSIIS + (k − 1) γIIIS + B˜(A)IS
}
[(i+1) j (k−1)]n
− βAi
{
jγSIIS + kγ
II
IS + B˜
(A)
IS
}
[ijk]n
+ βD (j+1)
{
iρISSI + (k − 1) ρIISI + B˜(D)SI
}
[i (j+1) (k−1)]n
− βDj
{
iρISSI + kρ
II
SI + B˜
(D)
SI
}
[ijk]n (9)
which is defined over all non-negative integers n ≥ 2 and i+ j + k ≤ n. Eq. (9) is coupled to
the previous system of ODEs through the mean-field values of excess interactions B˜(x)UV ,
representing interactions with outside groups, given by
B˜
(x)
UV =
(∑
mm(m− 1) [UV ]m∑
mm [UV ]m
)
B
(x)
UV . (10)
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Fig 2. Parasitic interaction in a population where nodes all belong to two groups of 10 nodes.
Markers represent average results of Monte Carlo simulations with error bars representing the
standard deviation of over 100 runs on networks of 50 000 nodes. Solid curves are obtained by
integrating the mean-field formalism. Results on the CS are shown in shade and those on its
ERN are shown in black. The dynamics follow βD = 0.02, βA = 0.25,
αD = αA = τD = τA = 1.0, ρISUV = 1, ρ
II
UV = 10 and γ
XY
UV = 0.05 except,
ρISSS = γ
SI
SS = 1.0.
The first four terms of Eq. (9) are those corresponding to recoveries; positive for those
corresponding to cliques relaxing into [ijk]n and negative for those where [ijk]n relaxes into a
less infected state. The other terms represent each possible infection event. Notice that creating
a k individual implies either removing a i or j, through their infection with contagion 2 or 1
respectively; just as recoveries can create i or j individuals when a k individual recovers from
contagion 2 or 1.
2.4 Validation
To validate the accuracy of our mean-field description, we run simulations on highly clustered
networks where every node belongs to 2 cliques of size 10. We use this network for two reasons:
First, to avoid degree-degree correlations, such that we know that the effect of clustering will be
the main structural effect. Second, to feature a realistic local clustering coefficient, C, i.e. the
ratio of triangles to pairs of links around a given node, which is here C = 0.47. In Fig. 2, we
show prevalence for the disease and awareness over time on a clustered (CS) and an exponential
random graph (ERN), using both Monte Carlo simulations and our ODE system. The accuracy
of the mean-field approximations were expected given Refs. [17, 18], and for the rest of the
paper we therefore rely on the ODE system rather than slower Monte Carlo simulations.
Most importantly, while we know that an awareness campaign or network clustering can
both hinder the spread of a disease, it appears that network clustering can actually help a disease
spread further when it is competing against a second contagion such as an awareness campaign.
This result shows once more that the impacts of different dynamical or structural features can
combine in non-trivial ways in models of contagion on networks.
2.5 Two-step branching process
In Ref. [18], we also introduced a simple criterion to determine whether a clustered structure
would spread two synergistic contagions faster. This criterion can conceptually be thought of as
a generalization of the basic reproductive number (R0, the number of secondary infections from
an average infectious individual in a completely susceptible population), which is often used to
characterize the initial speed of epidemics, which in our case considers two infection steps in
order to include clustering. Physically, it can be interpreted as a two-step branching process, as
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we count the number of tertiary infections caused by a co-infected individual (i.e. how many
second neighbors will be infected). That being said, the analogy is imperfect: The “branching
process” does not repeat itself since we do not distinguish which contagion(s) caused those
tertiary infections. Yet, it proved to be a useful tool in Ref. [18] to identify the net effect of
clustering across parameter space; i.e., to determine whether clustering speeds up or slows down
propagation.
We start with a single node infected with both contagions, and denote the average excess
degree of recently infected nodes as z1 (i.e., we assume this node received the contagions from a
single neighbor and z1 describes the average number of other neighbors this node is expected to
have). For the first step of our criterion, we need to distinguish the probability of transmitting
only the disease, only the awareness, or both. Since we ignore re-infection events, the latter
scenario can occur in two ways: either by transmitting both while co-infected; or transmitting
the first (or second) while co-infected before recovering from it and then transmitting the second
(or first). Summing the two events yields the probability TII of a co-infected transmitting both
contagions to a given first neighbor, i.e.,
TII =
ρIISSβD
ρIISSβD + γ
II
SSβA + τDαD + τAαA
×[
γIIISβA
γIIISβA + τDαD + τAαA
+
τDαD
γIIISβA + τDαD + τAαA
(
γSIISβA
γSIISβA + αA
)]
+
γIISSβA
ρIISSβD + γ
II
SSβA + τDαD + τAαA
×[
ρIISIβD
ρIISIβD + τDαD + τAαA
+
τAαA
ρIISIβD + τDαD + τAαA
(
ρISSIβD
ρISSIβD + αD
)]
. (11)
Similarly, a co-infected node can transmit only the disease in two ways, either by infecting
while co-infected then recovering before the transmitting awareness or by recovering from
awareness before transmitting the disease. Again, summing these events gives the probability
TIS of a co-infected transmitting only the disease. The same logic applies to the probability TSI
of transmitting only the second contagion. We can thus write
TIS =
ρIISSβD
ρIISSβD + γ
II
SSβA + τDαD + τAαA
×[
1− γ
II
ISβA
γIIISβA + τDαD + τAαA
− τDαD
γIIISβA + τDαD + τAαA
(
γSIISβA
γSIISβA + αA
)]
+
τAαA
ρIISSβD + γ
II
SSβA + τDαD + τAαA
(
ρISSSβD
ρISSSβD + αD
)
, (12)
TSI =+
γIISSβA
ρIISSβD + γ
II
SSβA + τDαD + τAαA
×[
1− ρ
II
SIβD
ρIISIβD + τDαD + τAαA
− τAαA
ρIISIβD + τDαD + τAαA
(
ρISSIβD
ρISSIβD + αD
)]
+
τDαD
ρIISSβD + γ
II
SSβA + τDαD + τAαA
(
γSISSβA
γSISSβA + αA
)
(13)
In its first neighborhood, we now know that a single co-infected individual will on average
cause z1TII co-infections, z1TIS transmissions of the disease only, and z1TSI transmissions of
the awareness only. We call those secondary infections. Our two-step branching process then
looks at the number of tertiary infections, i.e. the number of transmission events of either
contagions in the second neighborhood.
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In a clustered network, there is an overlap between the second neighborhood and the first,
such that neighbors of the original co-infection can be infected during the second step of the
process if they were not already. Let us consider one of the z1TIS first neighbors infected only
with the disease and now trying to infect a susceptible node. We know that in its own first
neighborhood, a number (z1 − 1)C (TII + TIS) of them are already infected with the same
contagion (z1 − 1 is an approximation, equal to its excess degree minus the targeted susceptible
node). The fact that a fraction of its neighborhood is already infected by the root node is the
negative impact of clustering on the dynamics. However, a number (z1 − 1)C (TII + TSI) are
now also aware, such that they could transmit it to the node of interest and change its
transmissibility. This is a potentially positive impact of clustering depending on the nature of the
coupling between contagions (e.g. positive for the spread of awareness, negative for the disease
itself).
Still considering the same first neighbor infected with the disease only, we need to know the
rate at which it is co-infected by one of its (z1 − 1)C (TII + TSI) aware neighbors. Assume
that we know the value of that rate, denoted xD for a co-infection to a diseased node, then the
probability of co-infection before recovery would simply be xD/(xD + αD). Since we can also
write that probability as every node involved recovering before co-infection, we can require the
following equality:
xD
xD + αD
=
(
αD + αA
γSIISβA + αD + αA
)(z1−1)CTSI ( αD + τAαA
γIIISβA + αD + τAαA
)(z1−1)CTII
.
(14)
The same logic applies for co-infection involving a node that is aware but not sick. We can
solve for the effective rates of co-infection through clustering, i.e. xD and xA, and obtain
xD =αD
[(
αD + αA
γSIISβA + αD + αA
)−(z1−1)CTSI ( αD + τAαA
γIIISβA + αD + τAαA
)−(z1−1)CTII
−
(
αD + αA
γSIISβA + αD + αA
)(z1−1)CTSI ( αD + τAαA
γIIISβA + αD + τAαA
)(z1−1)CTII ]
, (15)
xA =αA
[(
αD + αA
ρISSIβD + αD + αA
)−(z1−1)CTIS ( αA + τDαD
ρIISIβD + τDαD + αA
)−(z1−1)CTII
−
(
αD + αA
ρISSIβD + αD + αA
)(z1−1)CTIS ( αA + τDαD
ρIISIβD + τDαD + αA
)(z1−1)CTII ]
. (16)
With these effective rates, we can write the probabilities of a tertiary transmission of either
disease or awareness, respectively T (D)IS , T
(A)
IS if coming from a node initially infected only with
the disease and T (D)SI and T
(A)
SI if coming from a node initially infected only with awareness. We
write
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T
(D)
IS = [1− C (TIS + TII)]
[
ρISSSβD
ρISSSβD + αD + xD
+
xD
ρISSSβD + αD + xD
(TIS + TII)
]
(17)
T
(A)
IS = [1− C (TSI + TII)]
[
0 +
xD
ρISSSβD + αD + xD
(TSI + TII)
]
(18)
T
(D)
SI = [1− C (TIS + TII)]
[
0 +
xA
γSISSβA + αA + xA
(TIS + TII)
]
(19)
T
(A)
SI = [1− C (TSI + TII)]
[
γSISSβA
γSISSβA + αA + xA
+
xA
γSISSβA + αA + xA
(TSI + TII)
]
,
(20)
where the initial factor is the probability that a given neighbor is currently susceptible and where
the two terms in brackets are respectively the probability of directly passing the correct
contagion before co-infection, or of passing it after co-infection. More directly, we can write the
probability of a tertiary infection of either disease or awareness from an individual who received
both contagion from the original co-infected:
T
(D)
II = [1− C (TIS + TII)] (TIS + TII) , (21)
T
(A)
II = [1− C (TSI + TII)] (TSI + TII) . (22)
From all of these, we write the number of tertiary infections of disease or awareness caused
by an original co-infected individual as
R
(D)
1 = z
2
1 (TIST
′
IS + TIIT
′
II) , (23)
R
(A)
1 = z
2
1 (TSIT
′
SI + TIIT
′
II) . (24)
These two R1 quantities are not generative numbers per se, as the process is not
multiplicative for two reasons: (i) we count all tertiary infections, not only nodes in the same
co-infected state as our original node and (ii) the next step in the process would imply facing
clustering in both the second and first neighborhood. Nevertheless, in Ref. [18], it was shown
that comparing R1 values obtained using C > 0 to that of an ERN with C = 0 allows us to
determine whether clustering slows down the dynamics (R1(C > 0) < R1(C = 0)) or speeds it
up (R1(C > 0) > R1(C = 0)).
3 Results
In this section, we investigate the final epidemic sizes and peak prevalence values within the
mean-field model, but also test the usefulness of the branching factor approach in identifying the
epidemic threshold of the model as well as the net impact of clustering. Indeed, we can use the
previous analysis to (i) identify whether the disease can maintain an outbreak despite clustering
and awareness (i.e. if R(D)1 > 1) and (ii) evaluate whether a clustered network structure will
lead to larger epidemic peaks than an equivalent random network (i.e. if R(D)1 /R
(A)
1 is larger
with C > 0).
3.1 Final sizes
We investigate the robustness of the endemic disease state on clustered networks in Fig. 3. The
most interesting case occurs when increasing the transmission rate βA of awareness can cause
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Fig 3. Using the same clustered network structure and parametrization as in Fig. 2, we now plot
the final prevalence (i.e. final steady-state size) of disease and awareness across a range of
parameters. a) We vary the transmission rate of awareness. b) We vary the transmission rate of
the disease. c) We vary the increase in awareness transmission around sick individuals. d) We
vary the decrease in disease transmission around aware individuals. The dotted vertical line
marks the analytical epidemic threshold (if any) as approximated by R(D)1 = 1. All parameters
are fixed to the following values unless we explicitly vary them: βD = 0.02, βA = 0.25,
αi = τi = 1, ρISUV = 1, ρ
II
UV = ρ = 100 and γ
XY
UV = γ = 0.005 except ρ
IS
SS = γ
SI
SS = 1.0.
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Fig 4. Differences in peak prevalence values between network structure. We again use the same
network structure and parametrization as in Fig. 2, with a fixed βD = 0.02, αi = τi = 1, and
with other interaction factors parametrized as ρISUV = 1, ρ
II
UV = ρ and γ
XY
UV = 1/(2ρ) except,
ρISSS = γ
SI
SS = 1.0. Panels a-c) show the time series of disease prevalence for three sets of
parameter values while panel d) study a large range of variations in β2 and ρ. The inset of panel
a) provides a closer look at the epidemic peak of both time series. The color axis in panel d)
shows the ratio of peak values obtained by integrating the mean-field system. The dotted line
shows the crossover regime predicted by our analytical branching factor analysis; it defines the
set of parameters for which R(D)1 /R
(A)
1 is the same on both clustered and random networks.
Finally, parameter values used in panels a-c) are shown with markers on panel d).
disease eradication by depleting the pool of susceptible individuals. At very low βA, the
awareness contagion fails to spread and the disease is left unhindered. At intermediate values of
βA, awareness is able to spread mostly due to its interaction with the disease, meaning it will
reach a fraction of those already reached by the disease and fail to invade the susceptible
population. In this regime, we find a non-monotonous relationship between the prevalence and
transmission rate of awareness because increasing βA increases the probability of awareness
reaching sick neighbors, while also decreasing the global fraction of sick individuals. After a
certain threshold in βA, the prevalence of the disease falls to zero and awareness then spreads as
a regular contagion.
As shown in Fig. 3, the epidemic thresholds predicted by R(D)1 = 1 are typically within a
factor 2 of the true epidemic threshold. While this is a good approximation, we find that in all
cases the branching factor analysis systematically underestimates the robustness of the outbreak.
This is most likely due to the fact that the analysis is seeded with a co-infected individual, while
awareness and disease are likely to drift apart, benefiting the disease.
3.2 Peak values
In Ref. [18], R1 was used to determine whether two synergistic diseases would spread faster on
a clustered or random network. The idea being that while clustering typically slows down
dynamics, there can be an acceleration associated with the synergistic interactions and the
benefit of being together by clustering. Here, both clustering in network structure and the
interaction with awareness slow down the spread of the disease. We therefore do not expect to
find a regime of accelerated disease spread. However, it is possible that clustering slows down
awareness more than it slows down the disease, in which case a slower dynamics might still lead
to a higher epidemic peak.
In Fig. 4, we vary the transmission rate of the disease and its interaction with awareness
while tracking whether R(D)1 /R
(A)
1 is larger with C > 0 (larger epidemic peak on a clustered
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structure) or with C = 0 (larger peak on the equivalent random network). We find that there can
indeed be two separate regimes and the branching factor analysis provides a good approximation
of where this crossover can occur.
4 Outlook
With disease transmission comes the possibility for awareness of the disease and of the risk
factors associated with its transmission. Awareness of the disease may cause individuals to
respond by reducing their own transmissibility or adopting preventative behaviors. Here, we
explored the effects of awareness in a model that looks at both disease and awareness as
co-contagions in a parasitic relationship: spread of the disease leads to transmission of awareness
which in turn leads to decreased disease prevalence as a result of reduced disease transmission
around aware individuals. Our results show that interacting co-contagion models lead to
different dynamics depending on the network structure on which they unfold. Characteristic
measures such as the final outbreak size and the peak incidence exhibit regimes where they can
be higher in networks exhibiting clustering than on equivalent but random network structures.
Altogether, our study highlights once again the need for disease models to go beyond
random networks as social clustering can lead to either smaller or larger forecasts depending on
the dynamics at play. We showed how interactions between contagions can combine with
network structure in non-trivial ways and are therefore especially important to include in disease
models. To this end, we have generalized the tools of Ref. [18] to account for more complicated
interaction mechanisms. In doing so, we end up with useful analytical tools, but their
development becomes so involved and complicated as to be almost intractable. This raises the
important problem of developing effective models for interacting contagions whose complexity
does not grow exponentially with the number of contagions or with the number of interaction
mechanisms. Indeed, not only do infectious diseases interact with social contagions such as
vaccination and other preventative behaviors, but they also interact, often synergistically, with
other biological infections [24–26]. New tools are therefore needed to account for all of these
interactions in a tractable and insightful analytical framework [27].
Finally, with these theoretical advances also comes the need for improved data collection on
the dynamics of awareness spreading and methods to measure how this materializes into
effective preventative behaviors. With most of it now shared on online social media, information
and messages regarding public health crises are increasingly important in shaping human
behavior during epidemics. Unfortunately, data surrounding that messaging are not readily
available to researchers and public health officials, even if we know it interacts in critical ways
with our models and forecasts. The parallel development of theoretical frameworks and of data
sharing protocols for social messaging related to public health crises will be invaluable going
forward. Public awareness is an integral part of public health and advances to address its social
media dimension should be integrated into existing public health surveillance systems.
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